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One-time pads are commonly acknowledged as the
holy grail of cryptography [1], but have limited applica-
tion in modern ciphers. In practice, an unbreakable one-
time pad (OTP) protocol requires storage of a large and
random key that must remain absolutely safe against
malicious attempts to copy it. As demonstrated by
numerous recent database breaches, key storage is in-
herently vulnerable when digital electronic memory is
used [2, 3]. In this work, we present a new optical sys-
tem and communication protocol that allows two par-
ties to securely share gigabits of ideally random OTP
keys without digitally saving any sensitive key informa-
tion. Each key is derived by optically probing the ran-
domness contained within a uniquely complex physical
structure and keys are shared with theoretically perfect
security. This novel method is extraordinarily resilient
to malicious duplication attempts and is capable of se-
curely storing communication keys at an unprecedented
density. Our scheme may additionally extend to public
key-based protocols, which, as photonic devices begin to
solve an increasing number of integrated circuit bottle-
necks, indicates volumetric scattering as a natural and
efficient communication key database.
Prior optical methods of establishing encrypted two-
party communication include classical spatial [4] and
temporal [5–9] setups, as well as quantum key distri-
bution [10] (QKD). Each of these approaches, including
the unconditionally secure connection offered by QKD,
must electronically save its keys [11, 12]. In a world
that increasingly requires secure mobile connectivity, a
non-electronic and portable key storage medium resilient
against invasive threats [2, 3, 13] can eliminate many of
conventional electronic memory’s intrinsic vulnerabili-
ties [14]. For example, attacks that can discretely re-
set [15], image [16] or freeze [17] the contents of flash
memory are well recognized by the security community.
Attempted safeguards that apply the inherent random-
ness within an integrated circuit [18–20], RFID chip [21],
and optical scattering medium [22–25] implement what
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Fig. 1. The physical OTP. (a) The theoretically perfect
OTP mixes a binary message m with a random digital key
k of equal length to create an ideally encrypted ciphertext
c. (b) Storing keys within a volumetric scatterer’s random
structure (PUF A) helps address the inherent insecurity of
digital memory. Keys are accessed with specifically shaped
optical probes (green light). If the volumetric scatterer’s
structure is truly unique and unclonable, then physical trans-
portation appears the only method of sharing keys, which is
impractical. (c) The physically secure OTP protocol. The
digital XOR of keys from PUF A and B, which itself forms
an encrypted OTP ciphertext, helps form an information-
theoretically secure link between the two uncopyable devices.
is often referred to as a physical unclonable function
(PUF). However, due to their significantly limited bit
capacity, previous PUF setups have only been demon-
strated with terminal-based identification [22–25] and
public-key protocols [26, 27]. Their potential applica-
tion to perfectly secure OTP communication is further
compounded by the fact that outputs of different PUF
devices are independent, and thus not synchronized.
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Fig. 2. The construction and operation of a CPUF. (a) Sequentially over time, n random phase patterns pi are displayed
on an SLM. (b) A microscope objective (MO) focuses each random wavefront from the SLM onto a volumetric scatterer. The
scrambled light emerging from the material passes through a designed aperture before being detected by a CMOS sensor. (c)
Each detected speckle image r is digitally transformed into an ideally random key k with a constant digital whitening projection
operator W . (d) Optical scattering is mathematically represented by a complex random Gaussian matrix T and (e) digital
whitening is described by a sparse binary random matrix W . The combination of one unique T and general W per CPUF
device leads to an ideally random multi-gigabit key space that is very difficult to characterize or clone. (f) The experimental
CPUF setup, including all components in (b).
In this paper, we report a novel approach for im-
plementing an optical scattering-based communication
PUF (CPUF) that enables the reproducible generation
of gigabits of statistically random keys. We further re-
port a novel synchronization protocol, which in combi-
nation with a pair of these CPUF devices allows estab-
lishment of a physically secured OTP communication
link.
Before delving into specifics, we first briefly outline
the operation and security requirements of a successful
CPUF link (see Fig. 1). To communicate, two users,
Alice and Bob, will first connect their personal CPUF
devices over a known secure connection (e.g., by phys-
ically meeting, or by using QKD) to generate a shared
random key. Once separate and mobile, they may se-
curely exchange messages over any public channel un-
til all shared key bits are exhausted. Besides offering
OTP-strong encryption (i.e., eavesdropping is theoret-
ically impossible), a secure CPUF link must meet the
following requirements: first, its security must not de-
pend upon any electronically stored data. Second, a
malicious third party (Eve) with temporary access to a
CPUF must not be able to efficiently copy or model its
contents. And third, if Eve steals a device she must not
be able to effectively send or receive messages.
The above requirements are met by storing random
keys within the optical device outlined in Fig. 2. To
generate a key, we first illuminate a volumetric scatter-
ing medium with a random coherent optical wavefront
defined by a spatial light modulator (SLM) (Fig. 2a).
An output field emerges with a profile that depends on
both the random input wavefront and the medium’s ran-
dom distribution and orientation of scattering particles.
A designed aperture mask then shapes the output field
before it propagates to an attached CMOS sensor. The
mask is patterned to ensure the output speckle follows
Markov statistics – an important condition for effective
random key generation [28]. A combinatorially large
space of possible wavelength-scale interactions enables
detection of many mutually random speckle field out-
puts from a set of different SLM phase profile inputs. We
demonstrate how over 10 gigabits of randomness may be
optically extracted from within a 2 mm3 volume.
This large amount of extractable physical random-
ness is described by mathematically representing opti-
cal scattering with a random transmission matrix [29]
T (Fig. 2d). The output scattered field created by dis-
playing the ith random SLM phase pattern pi may be
described by ui = T · pi. After the sensor detects the
output field’s intensity ri = |ui|
2, a fixed whitening and
noise removal operationW turns the speckle pattern into
a verifiably random and repeatable key ki (Fig. 2e).
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Fig. 3. Ideally secure CPUF communication protocol and its experimental demonstration. (a) During setup, Alice
and Bob securely connect their two devices and generate n CPUF keys k1..n(A) and k1..n(B) using the same n input SLM
patterns p1..n. Each key-mixture ki(A) ⊕ ki(B) is saved in a digital electronic dictionary that is assumed public, along with
its corresponding SLM pattern pi. (b) At a later time tc, Alice may send Bob a perfectly secure ciphertext c by selecting a
pattern p, re-creating key k(A), and then XORing this key with her message m. The public dictionary can be saved locally on
each device without any sacrifice to security. (c) Bob decrypts the received ciphertext. He uses p to both re-generate key k(B)
and to find the public dictionary’s corresponding key-mixture. The XOR of c with k(B) and the key-mixture reveals m. No
secret key is ever digitally stored, obfuscating any copy attack.
The SLM pattern pi and output key ki are thus con-
nected by,
ki = W · |T · pi|
2. (1)
The projection of optical field pi into the random matrix
T , uniquely defined by the scatterer within each CPUF
device, imparts key ki with its unclonable security.
A set of n random keys k1..n(A) generated by Alice’s
CPUF, along with a corresponding key set k1..n(B) gen-
erated by Bob’s CPUF, enable physically secure OTP
communication with the assistance of a digitally saved
public dictionary (Fig. 3). As described above, Alice
and Bob begin by establishing a secure connection be-
tween their two devices. While connected, they sequen-
tially probe their scatterers with the same set of n ran-
dom SLM phase patterns p1..n, respectively detecting
key sets k1..n(A) and k1..n(B) following equation (1)
(Fig. 3a). Key sets k1..n(A) and k1..n(B) reflect each
device’s unique transmission matrix TA and TB, but re-
main synchronized through Alice and Bob’s shared use of
SLM set p1..n. Without leaving any digital trace of an in-
dividual key, Alice and Bob populate a public dictionary
with each SLM pattern pi paired with the digital XOR
of the two keys it generates, ki(A)⊕ki(B), for 1 ≤ i ≤ n.
An eavesdropper will gain no information about an in-
dividual key from this saved XOR “key-mixture”, since
it takes the form of a secure OTP ciphertext.
Once mobile at a later time tc, Alice may securely
send Bob a message m by first randomly selecting an
unused pattern pi from the public dictionary to re-create
key ki(A) (Fig. 3b). Then, Alice may use this key to
create and send an XOR-encrypted ciphertext c, where
c = ki(A)⊕m (here we assume ki(A) andm are the same
length – longer messages are encrypted by concatenating
multiple keys). To complete the protocol, Alice must
also send Bob the index i of the SLM pattern pi she
displayed, which need not be encrypted.
Bob decrypts Alice’s ciphertext using both his CPUF
and the public dictionary (Fig. 3c). He displays pi
to optically regenerate key ki(B), and accesses dictio-
nary entry i to obtain the corresponding key-mixture
[ki(A)⊕ ki(B)]. The decoded message is then obtained
by an XOR of these two sequences with the received
ciphertext:
ki(B) ⊕ [ki(A)⊕ ki(B)]⊕ (ki(A)⊕m) = m (2)
The total number of secure bits N that Alice and Bob
may share is proportional to the product of the number
of saved key-mixtures n and the number of bits within
each key |k|. Factors that limit N include display and
sensor resolution, scatterer size, and allowed setup time
(Supplement A).
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Fig. 4. Experimental message transmission. Example messages m1 and m2 are sent between two synchronized CPUF
devices 24 hours after dictionary setup. Each message is encrypted to and decrypted from a statistically random ciphertext c.
The security of the above protocol relies upon the
CPUF key sets following what Shannon defines a purely
random process [1]. Possible deviations from pure ran-
domness fall into three categories: correlated bits within
the same key, correlations between keys, and the intro-
duction of noise between keys generated at time t0 and
at time tc. The sparse projection operatorW overcomes
such deviations to create keys that asymptotically ap-
proach information-theoretic security by sacrificing an
increasing number of available encryption bits [30]. In
practice, W ’s bit reduction factor is selected such that
each CPUF key set k1..n, viewed as one multi-gigabit
random sequence, passes all tests contained within two
statistical random number generator test suites com-
monly accepted as the standards for random sequence
certification (the Diehard [31] and NIST [32] tests, used
often to verify physically generated randomness [7, 8],
are detailed in Supplement F).
The CPUF devices used in experiment each contain a
2 megapixel transmissive phase SLM imaged onto opal-
diffusing glass, serving as our highly random scatterer.
A 2 cm light guide (to increase the average detected
speckle size) connects the scatterer to a 4.9 megapixel
CMOS detector. During public dictionary setup, we dis-
play n = 5, 000 different random phase patterns p to
generate 174.4 gigabits of raw speckle data from two
CPUFs, which is reduced to N = 10 gigabits of statisti-
cally verified [31, 32] randomness via the sparse matrix
operator W . The approximate theoretical limit of 150
gigabits of randomness per CPUF link (derived in Sup-
plement A) may be achieved using a thicker volumetric
scatterer, currently limited to 0.5 mm for optical stabil-
ity purposes. Improved-resolution SLM and CMOS ar-
rays may allow random bit densities to eventually reach
1 terabit/mm3 (Supplement B).
Experimental communication between two CPUFs
following our physically secure OTP protocol is demon-
strated tc = 24 hours after public dictionary setup in
Fig. 4. Due to the slight drift of scatterers, message
noise is introduced upon decryption. Error correction
helps remove this noise, but reduces the total number of
securely transmittable bits by a fixed fraction [33]. In
the included experiment, repetition coding with a code
rate of .025 improves the average bit rate error from
0.40 bits to 0.21 bits computed over 100 transmitted 0.4
megabit example messages.
With a stolen device, an eavesdropper Eve will re-
quire approximately 50 hours to characterize the random
structure of an ideally operating CPUF at the current
capture rate of 1.5 seconds per key. Faster capture is
not possible due to induced scatterer heating (see Sup-
plement G). Coupled with an appropriate device moni-
toring process, this delay should be sufficient to identify
any attempted theft, but currently sets the upper bound
on our device’s functional lifetime. Additional layers
of security, such as encoding shared SLM patterns or
enforcing a two-cycle communication requirement, help
prevent Eve from obtaining prior communicated keys or
utilizing a permanently stolen CPUF. Details of such
protocols, as well as a thorough list of possible alterna-
tive “side-channel” attacks, is presented in Supplement
G. Our physically secure protocol also makes it impos-
sible for Eve to recover any message after destroying
each CPUF, simply achieved by slightly moving or heat-
ing the scattering material, which also resets the devices
for a new communication round. While information-
theoretic security is a good starting point for any new se-
curity mechanism, the proposed protocol still currently
requires mixing of a message-length key over a secure
connection during setup. A public-key protocol adopted
to physical CPUF keys can remove any secure connec-
tion requirement and significantly reduce required key
length, but at the expense of sacrificing perfect OTP
security (Supplement H).
In conclusion, the demonstrated CPUF system ap-
plies optical scattering to access billions of bits of ran-
domness stored within an unclonable volumetric struc-
ture. Information-theoretically secure communication is
5achieved using a modified OTP protocol. Compared
with a large, electronically saved one-time pad, the
CPUF’s key is extremely challenging to copy or model
and can easily scale to provide terabits of repeatable ran-
domness within a small volume. Embedding the device’s
digital electronics within its volumetric scattering mate-
rial will further impede any attempted copy or probe
attack. With additional study, we hope the convenient
properties of optical scattering can solve enough of the
OTP’s practical shortcomings to rejuvenate interest in
its unbreakable security, even in the presence of infinite
computing resources.
Methods
Methods summary
One CPUF device uses a spatially filtered and collimated
solid-state 532 nm CW laser (Spectra-Physics, Excelsior
Scientific 200 mW) to illuminate a transmissive SLM
(1920x1080 pixel, 1x1.6 cm Epson HDTV LCD, BBS
Bildsysteme). The SLM is operated as a phase modula-
tor (without a second polarizer). The scatterer-detector
CPUF segment is composed of four main components
that are fastened together using an epoxy to minimize
any movement with respect to one another. First, the
base of the CPUF is a 2.2 µm, 2592x1944 CMOS pixel
array (The Imaging Source, Micron CMOS MT9P031)
with USB readout to a desktop computer. Second, a
glass light guide (1.24 cm Quartz disk, Mcmaster-Carr
1357T62) is fixed to the surface of the CMOS protective
glass. Third, a custom-printed amplitude-modulating
mask (Kodak LVT-exposed on film at 2032dpi, Bowhaus
Printing, 5 mm x 5 mm) is attached to the glass light
guide to serve as the speckle-shaping aperture. The
aperture size is designed to be approximately 1 mm
across, ensuring the average speckle size extends across
5 sensor pixels, enhancing speckle image stability. The
apodizing mask follows a 2D-separable Cauchy distribu-
tion to ensure the speckle exhibits the required proper-
ties of a Markov random process (see Supplement C).
99% of the mask’s transmitted light is contained within
its central 1.2 mm2 area. Fourth, the volumetric scatter-
ing material opal diffusing glass with 0.5 mm scattering
volume thickness (Edmund Optics NT46-645) is fixed
above the aperture mask.
Key acquisition and processing
A low laser power ( 0.2 µW) was used to illuminate each
CPUF, preventing speckle pattern decorrelation from
material heating but requiring a 1.5 second image expo-
sure time. Image capture and SLM screen control were
driven through a Matlab interface. After capture, the
speckle was transformed into a 1D vector and whitened
into a key via multiplication with a matrixW (details in
Supplement D), with one large sparse W stored locally
on a desktop computer for use by two CPUF devices,
along with the public dictionary containing the shared
set of n binary random SLM patterns and the XOR key-
mixtures from connection setup. W need not be unique
for each CPUF device, nor kept secret. Each binary
SLM pattern was selected uniformly at random from [0,
pi] to minimize the probability of key collision. Commu-
nication was experimentally achieved between two simi-
larly constructed CPUF devices by populating a public
dictionary, waiting 24 hours, and then using the same
optical setup to execute the protocol outlined in Fig. 3.
Specific encrypt-decrypt parameters for the transmitted
messages in Fig. 3(d) are in Supplementary Table 1,
where each message contains 0.4 megabits after error
correction, as detailed in Supplement E.
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